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A relevant question in social science is whether cognitive bias can be instigated by social pressure 
or is it just a rational reaction to incentives in place. Sport, and association football in particular, 
offers settings in which to gain insights into this question. In this paper we estimate the 
determinants of the length of time between referee appointments in Spanish soccer as a function 
of referee decisions in favour of the home and away team in the most recent match by means of 
a deep-learning model. This approach allows us to capture all interactions among a high-
dimensional set of variables without the necessity of specifying them beforehand. Furthermore, 
deep-learning models are nowadays the state of the art among the predicting models which are 
needed and here used for estimating effects of a cause. We do not find strong evidence of an 
incentive scheme that counteracts well-known home referee biases. Our results also suggest that 
referees are incentivised to deliver a moderate amount of surprise in the outcome of the game 
what is consistent with the objective function of consumers and tournament organisers. 
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 Subjective decisions play an important role in many domains of life such as, for example, 
family, clinical judgement, jurisdiction, management, and policy. Statistics in social science has 
typically analysed the different problems associated to this issue under, at least, two different 
perspectives. First, a branch of literature has explored the importance of incentives to explain 
different types of human decisions regarding, for example, providing information in surveys 
(Stecklov et al, 2018), and  legislative behaviour (Titiunik and Feher, 2017). 
A second approach considers the concept of cognitive bias introduced by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) as a mistake in reasoning as a result of using heuristic rules to reduce the 
complexity of the problem. These rules are affected by subjective preferences or beliefs and 
therefore, decisions are not explained in terms of monetary incentives but from the inability of 
the decision maker to deal with a complex amount of information in a limited amount of time 
typically in situations of high social pressure. 
Sports economics, and football in particular, has offered many natural experiment situations for 
applied statisticians, psychologists and behavioural economists to test for the presence of 
cognitive bias in the process on making decisions under external pressure; see for example 
Garicano et al.  (2005) and Buraimo et al. (2010) just to mention two examples. There are 
important reasons for that. First, data on referee decisions are recorded and scrutinised. 
Second, football is an interesting sport in this respect as there is a high degree of discretion in 
many referee decisions such as the added time at the end of the game and the intentionality or 
otherwise of a handball and a violent action. Moreover, football is a low scoring game and any 
decision can potentially have an important impact on the final score of the match. 
However, as far as we are concerned, with the only exception of Price et al. (2012), the 
previous sport literature on referee cognitive bias has ignored the incentive scheme that 
football referees face when making their decisions. This is a very relevant issue as to judge a 
decision as irrational or biased is necessary to explore whether it is just a rational response to 
the incentive scheme offered by the agent. Price et al. (2012) hypothesised that referee 
resolutions could aim to increase consumer satisfaction by being favourable to home teams and 
trailing teams in a set of play-off basketball games. Moreover, they provided indirect empirical 
evidence for this hypothesis.  
 
In this paper we explore the incentive scheme of referees in the top tier of the Spanish football 
league (Primera División) by estimating how a referee decision in a match could affect the 
number of weeks that a referee must wait to be appointed for the next game. Of course, being 
able to referee again in a short period of time is not the only reward that a referee can obtain 
from his work, but it is the only one that can be consistently and publicly observed through all 
our analysis period. Traditionally, ‘la nevera’, or ‘the fridge’ in English, is an expression in the 
Spanish jargon to apply to a referee who is punished by not working for several weeks because 
of important decision mistakes in his last match. The institution responsible to make this 
decision, the Spanish Football Federation, does not report information about which referees 
are in this situation but its existence itself is an empirical question to be investigated.  
We investigate how decisions on penalties and the number of sent off players due to yellow 
and red cards affect the length of time for the next referee appointment. Moreover, we study if 
their consequences are significantly different when they favour the home and the away team. 
This is relevant to get evidence on whether the incentive scheme offered to soccer referees 
counteracts or explain the biased reported in the previous literature.  We also analyse whether 
referees are incentivised to deliver expected results. In principle, it is reasonable to assume that 
organisers promote some amount of surprise that adds excitement to the competition but at 
the same time, they do not want a referee with a very large influence in the outcome of the 
match. 
Our causal analysis is conducted by means of a deep-learning (DL) model, see Schmidhuber 
(2015). Causality is here understood as the estimation of effects of causes. This requires 
accounting for main confounders along with a flexible and reliable prediction model for the 
response variable (the DL model). We took this approach because of two important reasons. 
First, a DL model is a sophisticated approach that enriches our analysis by allowing us to 
investigate the contribution of an extremely large number of variables in the model and the 
estimation of highly non-linear causal responses of our focus variables that can be potentially 
interacting with many covariates without the necessity of specifying them beforehand and also 
performing model selection procedures. This is possible because of the availability of a large 
dataset which allows for model selection (which is intrinsic in DL) as long as estimation of 
effects. More importantly, under most standard econometric approaches, model specification 
and the results of analysis themselves can be influenced by researcher cognitive biases. 
Silberzahn and Uhlmann (2015) report the results of a crowdsourcing analysis where different 
researchers were supplied with the same dataset asking them to provide an empirical estimation 
for a specific answer on racial bias for football referees. They found substantial differences in 
their responses. DL specifications are not subjective but decided by the machine learning 
algorithm. Essentially, the DL can be viewed as a complicated regression model in which we do 
not specify principal effects along with their interactions, but allowing for all possible effects 
(subject to the specified regressors) as data will estimate the most appropriate model in a non-
parametric fashion. This is what avoids analyst subjectiveness. 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Next section discussed the related 
literature on soccer referee bias. In the following section, we present our data and the empirical 
approach used in the analysis. Estimation results are shown and discussed in Section 4 and 
some concluding remarks follow in Section 5. 
 
  
2. Related Literature 
 
Garicano et al.  (2005) initiated the analysis on football referee bias by studying the tendency 
for referees in the Spanish football league to increase stoppage time in close games when the 
home team is trailing compared to a situation when the home team is leading. More specifically, 
when the home team is trailing by one goal, the average added-on time increases by 35% above 
the norm; but when the home team is leading by one goal, there is a 29% reduction in stoppage 
time compared to the average. Garicano et al.  (2005) inspired other studies to extend this 
analysis to other leagues. Thus, Sutter and Kocher (2004) using information from the German 
Bundesliga during the 2001 season found that if the home team is ahead by one goal or the 
scores are level, added-on time is between 20 to 50 seconds lower than when the home team is 
trailing by one goal.  
The literature has also found a lower evidence of disciplinary sanctions (in terms of red and 
yellow cards) for home teams in the English Premier League (Dawson et al., 2007), the top tier 
of the Bundesliga and the English Premier League (Buraimo et al., 2010) and in European cup 
matches (Dawson and Dobson, 2010). 
However, the analysis of referee biases is not restricted to home advantage. Although it is out 
of the scope of this paper a comprehensive revision of the literature, we mention three 
examples; the first two use data from the American National Basketball Association League, 
and are Price and Wolfers (2010) and Price et al. (2012). Price and Wolfers (2010) find evidence 
of referee preferences for players whose ethnicity is the same as the majority of the referee 
crew while results in Price et al. (2012) explore other types of biases such as referee predilection 
for close games and loser teams. The third example, Gallo et al (2013) consider implicit 
discrimination against black African players in the English Premier League via the incidence of 
disciplinary measures.  
A main reason to explain the presence of referee bias is the role that social pressure exerts on 
their decisions. In the case of home advantage, pressure can be a function of attendance. For 
example, Garicano et al. (2005) and Pettersson-Lidbom and Priks (2010) find that a significant 
amount of home bias in the top tier of the Spanish and the Italian League respectively are 
influenced by the ratio of attendance to stadium capacity but Buraimo et al. (2010) do not find 
evidence to support the hypothesis that a lower incidence of disciplinary actions for the home 
team is explained by the size of the crowd but it can be explained by the absence of running 
tracks in stadia.  
However, pressure not necessarily comes from attendance. In fact, social attention can also 
affect the decision-making process. Pope et al. (2018) replicate the analysis on racial bias by 
Price and Wolfers (2010) using more recent data finding that the effects are no longer 
significant when they consider the 2007-2010 period. Given that the NBA does not appear to 
have made any attempt to address the issue, the authors’ interpretation is that increased 
awareness of racial discrimination in NBA refereeing was sufficient to eliminate that racial 
discrimination. An additional explanation, which is particularly relevant in this paper, for the 
presence of home bias is provided by Price et al. (2012).  They hypothesised that referee 
preferences for the home team, rather than an irrational decision, could serve to increase 
consumer satisfaction. A similar situation occurs with close games. They empirically tested this 
idea by estimating the impact from previous estimates of referee preferences for home teams, 
close games and differences in winning percentages between home and away teams (Match-up 
Coefficients) on the probability that a referee is assigned to a playoff game which can be 
considered as an obvious and visible form of compensation. Only Match-up Coefficients turns 
out to be significant in that regression. This was interpreted as an indirect evidence on the 
existence of incentives for bias.     
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 3.1. Data 
The Spanish Primera Division is the top tier of the Spanish football. The first edition of the 
two top tiers Spanish leagues took place in season 1928-29 and the tournament was played 
every year since then with the only exception of the period between 1936 and 1939 due to the 
Spanish Civil War. The competition has worked as a round-robin tournament where clubs are 
promoted and relegated based on performance. Throughout the history of the competition, 
only three clubs have been present in all of the editions of the Spanish Primera Division: Real 
Madrid, Atletico de Bilbao and FC Barcelona.  
The Real Federacion Española de Futbol (RFEF) is the organiser of the Spanish Football 
League and its subordinate division, Comite Tecnico de Arbitros (CTA)2 is the responsible to 
appoint referees to the different games. Through the history, there has been 31 different 
presidents of the RFEF. The last one, Jose Maria Villar, has been the longest-lasting president 
being in charge from 1988 to the end of our analysis period. The way to allocate referees has 
been affected by different policy stance periods but, with the exceptions of seasons 1953/54-
1956/7, 1971/72 to 1975/76 and 1996/7 to 2004/05 were referees were randomly appointed, 
there has been some degree of discretion in these decisions.  We collected match level data for 
                                             
2 Also known as Comite Nacional de Arbitros 
the whole history (from 1929 to 2017) of the top tier of the Spanish League from the database 
BDFUTBOL at the url: https://www.bdfutbol.com. For each game, the variable whose 
response we want to analyse is the number of weeks a football referee must wait until he 
referees the next football match (time). We are interested in cases with large number of weeks as 
small amounts of time are supposed to be purely random. Therefore, we consider cases with 
more than two weeks that a referee must wait. Two important features must be mentioned 
about this variable. Firstly, it is measured in terms of game weeks, the weeks when games take 
place, rather than actual calendar weeks. Secondly, this variable has a number of missing values 
which represent around 2% of the sample. This is due to referees being demoted, or retiring. 
Despite this, we have a total of 19636 observations for 22 variables, some of which are 
categorical with many also levels (the referee identity variable has 661 levels referring to an 
equal number of referees). This corresponds to a design matrix with 1152 columns, which is so 
large that any subjective variable selection is prohibitive. 
The covariates included in the model are the number of sent off players with two yellow cards 
for the home and away teams, home2yellow and away2yellow respectively; similar variables are 
defined for the number of sent off players with a red card, homered and awayred; the number of 
penalties in favour of the home and away teams, homepen and awayred. We also consider a few 
dummy variables to indicate, for example, the home and away team, the referee, the number of 
scored goals for the home and for the away team, outcome of the game, Villar period, round 
and season. We also consider the Brier Score of the match. This was obtained by using the Elo 
ratings of the teams to specify ordered probit models estimated with a window of 5 seasons. 
This model was used to obtain probabilities of home victories, draws and away victories that 
were considered to compute the Brier Score of the match.   
The following table shows a descriptive statistic for these variables.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
round 19,636 18.498 10.503 1 10 27 44 
homeyellow 19,636 1.811 1.754 0 0 3 11 
home2yellow 19,636 0.057 0.248 0 0 0 3 
homered 19,636 0.065 0.262 0 0 0 4 
homepen 19,636 0.129 0.355 0 0 0 3 
awayyellow 19,636 2.061 1.861 0 0 3 12 
away2yellow 19,636 0.075 0.279 0 0 0 3 
awayred 19,636 0.080 0.293 0 0 0 5 
awaypen 19,636 0.074 0.270 0 0 0 2 
homegoals 19,636 1.648 1.398 0 1 2 12 
awaygoals 19,636 0.977 1.039 0 0 2 8 
briar.score 19,636 0.111 0.120 0 0 0.2 1 
time 19,636 4.021 2.618 3 3 4 44 




Season 19,636 87      
Referee IF 19,636 661      
Outcome 
19,636 






TeamID - Home 19,636 231      






FALSE (7862)    
 
3.2. Rationality behind causal estimation of referee relegation. 
The aim of this study is to estimate the causal effect for a referee in previous game 𝑖 with 
respect to its action 𝐷𝑖 on the time he has to wait for refereeing the next match 𝑌𝑖, such that 
the Average Treatment Effect on for a referee in game 𝑖 is defined as 𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖 =
𝐄𝜋(𝑌𝑖|𝑋𝑖=𝑥𝑖,𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎)(𝑦𝑖(𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑𝑜) − 𝑌𝑖(𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑𝑐)|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖), where 𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑𝑜 is the observed action 
in previous game 𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑𝑐 represent the action he could have taken. For instance, 𝐷𝑖 =
𝑑𝑜 could be that we have observed zero red cards, while 𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑𝑐 represent the what if situation, 
e. g. what if on previous match 𝑖, the referee would have shown two red cards. The latter 
represent the counterfactual situation which corresponds an estimation of the counterfactual 
wait time 𝑌𝑖 considered the random variable that must be predicted as neither 𝐷𝑖 = 𝑑𝑐 have 
been observed, nor 𝑌𝑖. Furthermore, ATE is defined upon the expectation of the random 
variable 𝑌𝑖 conditional on all information on previous game 𝑖 including that on the referee itself 
(i. e. its ID) and the observed sample. The predictive model 𝑌|𝑋, 𝐷 (that for sake of simplicity, 
we refer to it as 𝑌|𝑋, intending that 𝑋 includes 𝐷) we employed and detailed in the next 
section, is an approximation of the Bayesian predictive distribution (the one that appears on 
the sub index of the expectation). This approach is alternative to one that matches referees 
with, say, 0 red cards on a match with referees with 2 red cards based on their estimated 
propensity scores. The application of the propensity score methodology is only possible if there 
is a region of common support between the two groups of referees. In our problem such 
common region also includes, for instance the teams involved in the match along with whether 
they were home or away. Such a common region simply does not exist. Moreover, in order to 
satisfy the strong ignorability assumption, required for causal inference, we have to account for 
all possible collected confounding variables (i. e. elements of vector 𝑋𝑖) along with their 
interaction in the predictive model for 𝑌𝑖. The dimension of 𝑋𝑖 is such that it is impractical to 
specify which covariables use and their interaction beforehand, but let the method estimate the 
most suitable model for predicting 𝑌𝑖. This is one of the main advantages of the methodology 
considered in this paper as it allows for the identification and estimation of different types of 
nonlinear interactions between the treatment variables and the different covariates without the 
necessity of estimating different models for each interaction. Finally, in order to draw causal 
conclusions, it is necessary to have an almost perfect prediction model to capture all relations 
between the response and the predicting variables including that on which we want to evaluate 
the causal effect. Again, the deep-learning predictive model that we are using represents the 
actual state of the art in model prediction with high dimensional data and large datasets. 
 
  3.3. The deep-learning predicting model  
A deep-learning (DL) model is a neural network with many layers of neurons (Schmidhuber 
2015). DL refers mostly to an algorithmic approach rather than a specific probabilistic model, 
although both components are present in DL (see Breiman, 2001, for the merits of including 
both elements). Each neuron is a deterministic function such that two connected neurons 
correspond to a function of a function along with an associated weight 𝑤. Essentially, for a 
response variable 𝑌𝑖 for referee 𝑖 and a predictor variable 𝑋𝑖 (or an entry of the design matrix 
𝑋) we have to estimate 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑤1𝑓1 (𝑤2𝑓2 (⋯ (𝑤𝑘𝑓𝑘(𝑋𝑖)))), and the larger the 𝑘 is the more 
the network is “deep”. With many stacked layers of neurons all connected (a.k.a. dense layers) 
it is possible to capture high non-linearities and all interactions among variables. The approach 
to model estimation underpinned by a DL model is that of compositional function against that 
of additive function underpinned by the usual regression techniques including the most 
modern ones (i.e. 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑤1𝑓1 + 𝑤2𝑓2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑘𝑓𝑘(𝑋𝑖)). See Schmidhuber (2015) for more 
details.  
 
The DL model (in this case a non recurrent neural network) can be also interpreted, for the set 
of observations denoted by 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎, as a posterior mode estimation of  𝑃𝑟(𝑌|𝑋, 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) (Polson 
and Sokolov, 2017) from gaussian process priors through its probabilistic nature, which 
ultimately gives a strong statistical support to the analysis conducted here. However, due to its 
complexity, the whole distribution 𝑃𝑟(𝑌|𝑋, 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) cannot be evaluated but only its mode. This 
prevents a full Bayesian analysis of the problem, but it implies that the causal effects estimated 
here are those which maximise the probabilistic density given the observed data. 
In this setting 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖 can be scalar or vector and in particular 𝑌 is the scalar random variable 
of times (in weeks) and 𝑋 is vector of dimension 1152 as it incorporates the above predictors 
with all their levels when they are factors (i.e. there are 661 referees and hence 661 dummy 
variables representing the effect of the referee.). 
Estimating a DL model consists of estimating the vectors 𝑤1, ⋯ , 𝑤𝑘. Estimation requires the 
evaluation of a multidimentional gradient which cannot be evaluated jointly for all observations 
because of its dimensionality and complexity. Recalling that the derivative of a composite 
function is defined as the product of the derivative of inner functions (i.e. the usual chain rule 
(𝑓 ∘ 𝑔)′ = (𝑓′ ∘ 𝑔) ∙ 𝑔′( )) which is implemented for purposes of computational feasibility 
as a tensor product. Such tensor product is evaluated independently for batch of observations 
and it is implemented in the open source software Google Tensor Flow (Abadi et al. 2015) 
running on a NVidia Quadro GPU. Tensor product, independent evaluation, low cost 
processors (per unit) as GPU makes the DL approach popular nowadays. There are different 
optimisation algorithms to estimate 𝑤𝑠 and we used the Adaptive Subgradient Methods 
(ADAGRAD) (Duchi et al, 2011) in order to minimize the squared loss function, i.e. 𝑤 are 
estimated in order to minimize ∑ (𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖)
2𝑁=19636
𝑖=1  the quadratic differences between 𝑌𝑖 and 
the prediction ?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?1𝑓1(?̂?2𝑓2(⋯ ?̂?𝑘𝑓𝑘(𝑋𝑖) )). 
 
The structure of the model is the following: we have two dense layers, separated by a 
normalization batch layer and a dropout layer at 40% to avoid overfitting and achieve model 
parsimony. We have around 60 thousand parameters (i.e. weights) to be updated. Of course, 
some weights will be zero as they do not contribute to the gradient of the quadratic loss 
function and this avoids overfitting and implement the variable selection needed with 1152 
predictors. Furthermore, to achieve stability in estimation we introduced a normalization batch 
between the two sets of hidden layers (Ioffe and Szegedy 2015). Normalization batch is the 
usual operation of variable standardization (i.e. mean zero and variance one) applied to weights 
connecting two sets (layers) of all connected neurons. Ioffe and Szegedy (2015) show that this 
operation allows for better stability in the gradient of the whole function 𝑌|𝑋 estimated with 
the DL model. 
 
The following graphs show the result of the optimization procedure, iterated for 200 hundred 
steps. The loss in the training set (a sample subset randomly defined at a given step and used in 
the gradient) is practically monotone decreasing meaning that the model is learning from the 
data. On the other hand, the loss in the validation set (a subset of the training sample not used 
for fitting at that particular epoch (optimization step)) is almost always below that in the 
training set (used to calculate the weights) indicating that the model does not overfit the data 





Figure 1. Results of the Optimization Procedure 
 The estimated model can predict 50% of the variability of the response variable. This is indeed 
a significant result as it indicates that the length of time between referee appointments is not 
purely random (as expected) but can be forecasted in some way by a DL model  
 
        4. Analysis 
In this section, we explore the causal effects of referee decisions on the length of time that a 
referee must wait for his next appointment. More specifically, we estimate the impact of 
disciplinary decisions in terms of yellow and red cards, penalties and an indicator of how 
surprising the outcome of the last game was, which is measured by Brier Score.  
Three main hypotheses will be tested informally by means of the analysis of the prediction 
uncertainty arising from the DL model. The first one concerns the preference of the organisers 
for the home or away team. Although we cannot measure whether disciplinary decisions and 
penalties were fair or not, however, it is well known, from the literature, that there is consistent 
evidence (in particular for the Spanish League) of home referee bias regarding these decisions; 
see, for example, Garicano et al.  (2005). Therefore, organisers trying to counteract these biases 
must penalise referee decisions in favour of the home team relatively more than similar 
decisions in favour of the away team. However, on the other hand, organisers themselves could 
be also affected by the pressure generated by home supporters that could bias their decisions.  
Thus, there is no clear hypothesis on whether the Spanish Federation is going to punish more 
or fewer decisions in favour of the home compared to the away team. 
Another interesting hypothesis to test concerns the evaluation of the cost of making decisions. 
Under the omission bias hypothesis (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), referees would have 
incentives to not making decisions as mistakes in actions are more obvious than mistakes in 
inactions. According to this, not awarding penalties or sending players off would be more 
profitable for the referee than making any decision in this respect.   
A final issue of concern relates to the incentives that referees can face to deliver an unexpected 
result. Our hypothesis is that the Spanish Federation could incentivise a certain amount of 
surprise in the outcome of the games as this maintains interest in the competition.      
DL models are non-parametric techniques which not provide information on the effect of 
covariates. However, as discussed in the previous section, it is possible to estimate the causal 
impact of a given referee decision by comparing the expected response under factual and 
counterfactual observations. We do this by comparing the observed values of the response 
variable in a factual and the expected (i.e. the maximum a posteriori) in the counterfactual 
situation.  
In particular, counterfactual estimation is obtained by the fitted DL model including all 
predictors with the intervention variable  D changed in order to calculate the causal effect 
induced by a specific variable. This is founded on the fact that a model which perfectly predicts 
the response can be potentially used for causal inference. Formally, let X̌ be the matrix of 
confounding variables and let D be the intervention variable representing the counterfactual 
situation, i.e.  X̌ does not have the intervention variable (this is why X̌ and not just X). The 
range of factual values is set to be D = {0,1,2,3,4} while its assigned counterfactual values is 
D = {4,3,2,1,0}. This implies that the resulting casual effects are estimated for variations in the 
counterfactual situation (in respect to the factual) of magnitudes Z = {4,2,0, −2, −4} in the 
intervention variable. 
We evaluate casual effect for a given referee on the length of time to be appointed again of 
changing decisions about home2yellow, away2yellow, homered, awayred, homepen, awaypen 
and Brier Score. Given that our database corresponds to an extremely long historical period, a 
relevant question to answer is whether referees face different incentive schemes now and in the 
past. We estimate the causal effects before and after 1988  because it is the year that Jose Maria 
Villar took over as president of the Spanish Football Federation, and remained in position until 
the end of our data period. This period is denoted with the name Villar. However, this 
distinction was not made in the case of home2yellow and away2yellow because yellow cards 
were only introduced in football after 1970.  
We initiate our analysis by studying the expected penalization that a referee suffers as a 
consequence of decisions regarding the number or two yellow cards, red cards and penalties. 
These causal effects are shown in Figures 2 to 4. As our intervention variables are quantitative, 
causal effects are always represented by means of smoothing curves (which connects points on 
the horizontal axis). Such curves along with the 95% confidence intervals are obtained using 
GAM models (Wood, Pya, and Säfken 2016). 
Figure 2. Casual effect of variations in two yellow cards 
 
 
Figure 3. Casual effect of variations in red cards 
 Figure 4. Casual effect of variations in penalties 
 
A striking result is that increasing the number of two yellow cards for the home team reduces 
the number of weeks that a referee must wait to be appointed again while the opposite happens 
with red cards for the home team. A possible interpretation for this is that disciplinary 
sanctions by a referee are better understood when they are gradually taken rather than in an 
abrupt decision. However, we do not find evidence of any significant effect of variations in two 
yellow cards for the away team. This can be either due to the small number of observations for 
these events or to the fact that they are not significant. Remember that in order to avoid the 
influence of confoundings with respect to these intervention variables, personal history of the 
referee along with details of the match (teams, score, etc.) have been included in the analysis. 
Such confoundings are likely to better explain the response variable than the intervention 
variable. Regarding variations in the number of penalties, an increase generates a penalisation 
both for the home and the away team. However, the punishment in terms of weeks for 
increasing the number of home penalties has been reduced in the most recent period compared 
to the past.  
From figures 3 & 4, there is also evidence that both a high number of penalties and red cards 
increase the number of weeks that a referee must wait to be appointed again. The evidence also 
suggests the presence of an incentive scheme that favor inaction as there is no penalization for 
not whistling any penalty or not showing any red card.  
When comparing the two different periods of analysis: before and after Villar took over as 
president of the Spanish Federation, it can be observed that in the Villar period there is a 
higher penalisation for a high number of away red cards while the opposite happens with the 
number of home red cards. However, when we turn our attention to penalty kicks, there is also 
evidence that the penalisation for a high number of penalties in favour of the home team has 
been reduced as well.  
 
For a better analysis of the possible presence of incentives for home referee bias decisions, we 
estimate the causal effects of differences in 2 yellow cards, red cards, and penalties between the 
home and the away team for the most recent period. Figure 5 shows these estimations. Results 
indicate that referees have incentives to show relatively more red cards to the away team but 
more yellow cards to the home team. Regarding the causal impact of penalty kicks, our findings 
do not support the hypothesis of home bias incentives in terms of penalties as referees that 
increase the number of penalties in favour of the home team relatively to the away team have 
to wait for more time to be appointed again. Overall, we do not find definitive evidence of an 
incentive scheme, especially concerning red cards, to counteract the presence of home bias in 
referee decisions.  
Figure 5. Casual effects for home vs away referee decisions.  
  Now we turn our attention to study how referees are penalised to deliver unexpected results. 
In order to study this we consider Brier Score that is an indicator of how surprising the 
outcome of a game is compared to what it was ex-ante expected. Causal effects for Brier Scores 
in the two reference periods are shown in Figure 6.  There are many crossing points in the 
evolution of the causal effects in the two periods but they are significantly different for 
extremely low and high values of Brier Score suggesting that in the last period the Spanish 
Federation penalises referees who deliver highly expected or unexpected results. This is 
consistent with the insight that organisers care about the excitement of the competition and try 
to incentivise a moderate amount of surprise in the final score of the match. However, highly 





Figure 6 Casual effects for Brier Score  
  
        5. Concluding remarks 
We have investigated the incentive scheme that referees in the top tier of the Spanish football 
league face when making different types of decisions. Our results indicate that referees are 
motivated to whistle a fewer number of penalties in favour of the home compared to the away 
team. However, there is evidence of incentives to referees to send off more away players 
compared to home players. A possible interpretation for this is that, compared to a red card, a 
penalty has a direct effect on the score of the match, and hence makes home bias more 
apparent. We have also found some evidence of incentives for referees to omit decisions 
regarding red cards and penalties and to deliver a moderate degree of surprise in the final 
outcome of the game. 
The implementation of Video Assistant Referees (VAR) in the Spanish football from season 
2018/19 will help referees reducing the amount of uncertainty they face when making decisions 
and will make the influence of the incentives estimated in this paper less obvious. However, 
some interesting questions to explore in future analysis could be, for example, to study the 
influence of referee decisions on other types of incentives such as salaries or referee relegation 
and to extend this estimation to other sports competitions and other industries in which the 
outcome depends on subjective decisions. 
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